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veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus 
Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate 
 
The situation of complete certainty 
is reached only by observation of an 
infinite number of events (God’s Eye) 
Tibor Vámos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last years the debate on complexity has been developing and developing in 
transdisciplinary way to meet the need of explanation for highly organized collective behaviors and 
sophisticated hierarchical arrangements in physical, biological, cognitive and social systems. 
Unfortunately, no clear definition has been reached, so complexity appears like an anti-reductionist 
paradigm in search of a theory. 
In our short survey we aim to suggest a clarification in relation to the notions of computational 
and intrinsic emergence, and to show how the latter is deeply connected to the new Logical 
Openness Theory, an original extension of Gödel theorems to the model theory. The 
epistemological scenario we are going to make use of is that of the theory of vision, a particularly 
instructive one. Vision is an element of our primordial relationship with the world; consequently it 
comes as no surprise that carefully taking into consideration the processes of visual perception can 
lead us straight to some significant questions useful to delineate a natural history of knowledge. The 
common Greek etymological root of “theory” and “vision” sounds like a metaphor pointing out the 
analogy  between the modalities of vision and those we use “to see and build the world” (N. 
Goodman, 1978), because them both can say us something about the central role of the observer and 
the semantic complexity of cognitive strategies.  
 
  
2. REDUCTIONISM AND NAÏVE OBJECTIVISM 
 
Most of the problems in focusing the notion of complexity just come from the unsuitable 
extension of that naïve objectivism which represents the conceptual driftage of reductionism. This 
one is very useful a tool which has guaranteed Physics a considerable success; but when it is 
regarded as the unique and universal method an hidden postulate, apparently innocuous and natural, 
comes out: the world is “out there”, independent from the observer, organized by levels, explicable 
by means of a chain of theories logically connected and each description level can be derived from 
the previous one simply by using proper mathematical techniques and, at the most, “bridge-laws”. 
Such kind of complexity corresponds to the algorithmic complexity (Chaitin, 2007); it measures 
the information that a Turing machine has to process to solve a problem in relation to the processing 
time and space (program length). It is interesting noticing how Artificial Intelligence and the current 
Everything Theories share the same conception: a Laplace’s demon (Hahn, 2005) can solve “mind” 
in purely syntactical terms just in the same way as it reduces the physical world variety to a nutshell 
of fundamental particles and interactions. Similarly, in such a Universe nothing authentically new 
can turn out, and the only detectable emergence is the computational one (detection of patterns) 
which is obtained by the fundamental algorithmic compression. 
 An example of the above-mentioned emergence is well represented by the non-linear chaotic 
systems. There, the long-rage predictability is missing, but it is possible the step-by-step 
computation of the system’s trajectories in the phase space. Even if such ingenuous idea of 
reductionism has been radically criticized (Anderson, 1979;  Laughlin, 2006 Laughlin e Pines, 
1999; Laughlin, Pines et al., 2000) and it has been observed that this kind of description can only be 
fulfilled within classical systems (Licata, 2008a), naïve objectivism and the independence from the 
observer are still the “hidden” postulates in the scientific activity. 
In order to find an alternative we have to look at a dynamic theory of relationship between the 
observer and the observed which takes into account the co-adaptive processes as well as the 
ecological nature of the mind/world relations. 
 
 
3. VISION BETWEEN SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 
 
The difficulties in developing artificial vision devices have been strongly instructive in 
understanding the semantic features of the complexity involved in the process. As it is known, the 
symbolic-algorithmic approach of classical cognitivism has succeeded only in recognition of very 
simple shape and dynamics, while connectionism –thanks to bio-morph inspired parallel and 
distributed computing -  has achieved larger success in recognition of even greatly complicated 
patterns. Anyway, there’s a common problem with them both: the meaning of vision. To clarify this 
crucial point, it will be useful to shortly examine some of the salient outcomes in neurodynamics. 
When a visual impulse related to an object (frequency, luminosity, dynamics and so on) hits the 
retina, the information is distributed on the receptor-fields of many specialized neural “agencies”. 
The classical problem is to bring the activity of many cognitive agencies back to a perceptive act we 
experience as a single one. In these years, the coherence process which makes the neural agencies 
synchronized so as to respond in collective and unitary way to an object recognition –know as 
“feature binding” (Singer & Gray 1995; Varela et al., 1999) – has been experimentally verified. If 
we consider each neuron as a threshold non-linear device, it means that the coherence process needs 
the threshold rearrangement of each neuron so as to arrange its output according to the other 
neurons involved in the same perception act.  S. Grossberg studied the general logic of such feed-
back process by ART, Adaptive Resonance Theory (Grossberg, 1988;  Levine, 2000). The input is 
triggered by a series of bottom-up stimuli (physical signals carrying the visual information and 
biological transduction mechanisms to the working memory towards the cognitive agencies) which 
are selected and set by top down signals acting as global constraints on the collective neural 
response which allow the recognition and the response-outputs. 
             (from Julesz, 1991) 
The bottom-up activities, in principle, can be totally codified as syntactic processing according 
to reductionist logic, but the same does not go for the top-down features which, instead, depend on 
the previous memories, knowledge and aims of the observer. Without such elements there’s no 
vision, just pattern recognition. The basic evolutionary meaning of top-down dynamic constraints - 
some of which are part of our deep genetic baggage – consists in filtering the stimuli related to 
essential information for adaptation. The top-down processes selectively amplify the expected 
stimuli and extinguish or soften other ones according to a priority ranking centred on the 
stratification of previous experiences. So, the resonance feed-back between neural agencies can be 
considered as an information “evaluating” so as to select a stimulus from the background noise and 
activate a motional and linguistic decision. On the other hand, it may happen that an impulse does 
not fall upon the already stored memories, in this case cognitive activity has to make the feature 
binding by building new categories and new interpretative codes able to create the required 
harmonization  
An interesting model of neural micro-dynamics for the adaptive relation between bottom-up and 
top-down processes uses the mechanisms of homoclinic chaos (Arecchi et al., 2002a, 2002b). Since 
their famous programmatic paper, the “Dynamical System Group” had put forth the hypothesis that 
the order/disorder peculiar mixture of non-linear dynamics could be a model for the critical 
sensitivity of the attentive processes regarded as information amplifying (Crutchfield et al. 1986; 
Licata, 2008b). Within the homoclinic chaos scenario the neuronal spikes are considered as regular 
orbits having erratic times. When a stimulus is recognized via an ART feed-back, such spikes get 
synchronized by means of a phase-linking process. 
  
 (from  Arecchi et al., 2002a, 2002b). 
 
 The duration and the specific modalities of the coherence depend on the kind of experience and 
give a natural explanation for to the consciousness’ time as the duration of the coherence states 
(Libet, 2005). S. Zeki hypothesized the activation of this kind of processes for the neural agencies 
related to “shape” and “motion” which come into play in the aesthetic experience (Zeki, 2000). 
Tangible and suggestive examples of coherence processes realized by vision are the Escher’s 
famous lithographs or the dilemmas like “duck-rabbit” (see for ex. Jastrow, 1973). There we have a 
reliable performance of visual perception mechanisms, but it does not correspond to the semantic 
dimension of seeing; this one only occurs when coherence makes an interpretation “to collapse”. 
 
 
The D. Hofstadter “statistical mentalics” hypothesis is centred on the idea to carry out a 
correlation between symbolic and sub-symbolic states, like it has been done in Statistical Physics 
with thermodynamics and kinetic theory of gases (D. Hofstadter, 1996). Following this physical 
model, it has been suggested that different sub-symbolic states correspond to the same cognitive-
symbolic description (Clark, 1991). One might thus be tempted to assimilate the top-down 
constraints with the cognitivism high level symbolic language and the visual perception bottom-up 
processes with the connectionism low-level one. Nevertheless, it has been showed that this kind of 
program can only be carried out in few, very simple cases (Smolensky, 2006), moreover the scheme 
here discussed provides further reasons for such hypothesis failing. Actually, the top-down 
constraints are not fixed schemes that can be assimilated to an algorithm, but they are neural 
landscape continuously and dynamically redefining by the system/environment relations. The 
computational descriptions of classical cognitivism (Marr, 1983) only work in “close” worlds - far 
from the emergence zones - when the ART process does not remodel the cognitive scenario. Some 
experiments on the olfactory memory of locusts and rabbits (Laurent & Wehr, 1999; Laurent et al., 
1996; Walter Freeman, 2000) are quite significant. The first experiment has revealed that the 
temporal sequence of the neuronal activities codifying on odour does not vary when the same 
stimulus is presented again, whereas, in rabbits, different sequences correspond to the same 
stimulus; it means that the rabbit’s cognitive dynamics changes at each experience so modifying its 
repertory of meanings. Differently from what statistical mentalics hypothesizes, top-down and 
bottom-up features of vision are not two different descriptive levels, but the facets of a single 
dynamic process. Therefore describing vision as a coherence process provides a way out of the 
classical representationalism tight corner as well as its microscopic version which is the 
“grandmother neuron”. What we are looking at is the evolutionary dynamics of observer-centred 
meanings, without these ones there is just passive perception of stimuli, but not authentic vision 
(Arecchi, 2001; Tagliasco & Manzotti, 2008).  Such analysis can be easily moved to the 
epistemological area of model building. 
 
4. SEEING BY MODELS 
 
There’s an old tendency in the “Platonic-inspired” epistemology to be able to abstractly 
outlining the knowledge method, compressing it in “agnostic” form with respect to meaning and 
making it as much independent from the observer as possible. An explicit program of this kind has 
been proposed within the ambit of Neopositivism in the “Encyclopedia of unified science”, which 
has been conceived as the empirical sciences equivalent of Whitehead and Russell “Principia 
Mathematica”, a purely formal-logic, syntactically well defined and totally self-contained structure 
of science knowledge. Here too, likewise in artificial vision, the difficulties in creating an 
“automatic scientist, have proven to be extremely instructive about the real dynamics of science 
knowledge production (Thagard, 1993 ; Magnani, 2006). 
Let us consider an S system studied by an Obs experimental apparatus and described by an M 
model. M is essentially made up of a set of variables, their evolution equations and the boundary 
conditions defining S. Once the Oi system’s observables are fixed (with i varying on a finite set), 
Obs can be completely specified by algorithm-like operational procedures, a Turing-Observer (see 
Licata, 2006). Under such conditions an M model can be regarded as an expert system manipulating 
the data obtained by the Turing-Observer, and the “competition” between the M models describing 
S can be considered a Bayesian procedure of this kind: 
 
 
(1) ( )
Oprob
MprobMOprob
OMprob
.
=  
The formula expresses the greater capacity of one model among the others to quickly climb the 
probability hill’s peak, so providing the maximum fitness in the space of O observables in terms of 
correlation and predictability according to the algorithmic compression criterion. The formula (1), 
applied to a single model perfectioning, can be seen as a Darwinian procedure as: model 
formulating – its matching to data – mutation and picking out of the maximum a posteriori 
probability.  
 
 
We can obtain a formally alternative, but conceptually similar description within the ambit of 
Game Theory. If we take into consideration the model with the highest score in the game whit the 
system’s values of observables, or within Fuzzy Theory, then we can say that the winning model is 
the one allowing a total defuzzification of the system. Patently, if theories (or the Nature!) worked 
like that, natural and conceptual ecosystems would be quite poor! In actual fact, in studying 
phenomena, we cannot identify a priori the system we are dealing with and its significant variables, 
it depends on the model choosing, that is to say very refined and “opportunist” choices (Einstein 
said that the scientist must appear as a type of unscrupulous opportunist to the epistemologist!). 
According to the above-outlined setting, the observational-experimental context is prearranged and 
fixed, it “takes a picture” from a frozen perspective. The most interesting things in research happen 
instead when we change the code and choose to observe the system from different viewpoints. It 
means that the builder of models changes his “perspective” and the variables, and he uses a 
different Obs observational-experimental context. In practice, the same system can be described by 
a family of models, finite or countably infinite, each one “specialized” in seeing different features 
which mirror the possible interactions between the observer – here an active agent – and the 
observed system (Minati & Guberman , 2007).There the (1) defines a multi-peaked model scenario 
which can be regarded as an indication of the semantic complexity of the system. 
 
 
  We can write the symbolic form of the relation between a system S and the model M 
representing the status of the knowledge about the system by means of the Obs observer’s set of 
choices at a given nth stage as: 
( ) ( )nn SObsM 1= . 
 
Obs1 is an operator which guarantees the correspondence between S and M. It means that the M 
model “sees” the data the S system produces through the correspondence operational procedures 
Obs2: ( ) ( )nn MObsdata 2exp =  
The acquisition of new experimental data can modify the model and require new strategies 
Obs3: 
( ) ( )nn dataObsM exp31 =+  
From the above expression, we have: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ( ( )))nnn MObsObsObsSObsM 231111 == ++ . 
The operators Obsi have not to be considered as “rigid” formal tools, but as a set of model-based 
procedures depending on the system’s nature and the observer’s goals. 
By putting Obs=Obs1,2,3 and generalizing the procedure at n stages, we have the recursive 
formula: 
(2) ( ) ( )( )0MObsM nn = , with n ∈ N . 
The (2) sums up the analysis we have carried out: the information extraction from the system S 
takes place via a succession n of M models – Von Foester eigen-models (Von Foester,1999) – 
representing the “perspectives” through which the observer “watches” the system. The model is 
thus a cognitive filter which realizes a coherence status between the system and the observer. 
Now, let us consider an infinite succession of interactions between the observer and the system: 
( ) ( )( )0lim MObsM n
n ∞→
∞
= . 
The natural question is: can this scenario based on models converge to a “fixed point”, a unique 
model that somehow contains all the others? We will find out the answer - in general - is a negative 
one. Nevertheless, we have first to focus on the hypothesis of a positive answer, that is to say – 
traditionally – the reductionist one. 
 
 
5. REDUCTIONISM’S SHORT-SIGHTEDNESS 
 
According to the widespread reductionist approach, the theoretical scenarios considered as 
fundamental are those whose “arrows always point downward” towards the system’s elementary 
constituents: particles, molecules, neurons, and so on. In spite of its great achievements, this 
strategy is sometimes a dead end road. If we focus our “resolution” on the elementary constituents, 
the information contained in the initial conditions per time unit – called Kolmogorov-Chaitin 
entropy – will quickly erode and the algorithmic complexity of the system will exponentially grow 
at the increasing of the amount of particles (Chaitin, 2007). In other words, we have to face a 
computational catastrophe or to change the code and to build a new model, for example based on 
new collective variables, in order to describe the system’s patterns. When syntax grows too 
complicated to be tackled in detailed way, it is more useful to select significant information on 
different levels. This is a cognitive strategy analogous to the one taken into consideration for vision: 
we focus our attention on a quantity of information which is quite long-lasting to be recorded and 
studied. 
These considerations are quite obvious in life and social-economic sciences, where the 
significant aspects do not merely dwell in “components”, but in the functional dynamics of the 
structures. Most of the “interesting” phenomena we deal with need global “architectural” 
approaches; these ones cannot be derived from the “fundamental bricks” because systems formed 
by very different elements can show really similar collective behaviours whose universality is much 
more significant than the bare individuating of the elementary components. That is the meaning of 
the Anderson’s famous “More is Different” (Anderson, 1979) which stressed precisely the 
universality of the spontaneous symmetry breaking processes in infinite state quantum systems as 
general conceptual frame for emergence (Pessa, 2002). Furthermore, different approaches tending 
to take into consideration the possibility to individuate the “constituent objects” as a consequence of 
the universal properties of the emergence processes have recently come out also in physics. 
Consequently, even the distinctions and correlations between “macroscopic state” and “microscopic 
state” are largely problematic and context-dependent (Licata, 2009). 
The reductionism limit lies in mainly focusing on the “level” notion as well as in aiming at a 
world description which consists in a chain of piled-level models resembling the “Hanoi tower”. 
Unfortunately, it is possible only within few, definite theoretical frames, such as the Effective Field 
Theories where the Quantum Field Theory syntax makes possible to build a chain of levels where 
each level individuates a scale of energy, times and lengths; it is thus possible to connect a level 
with the other one by proper “matching conditions” ruling the parameters of the bordering levels 
(Castellani, 2000). 
It has to be strongly stressed that the modeling process in science is not ruled just by the notion 
of level; it is, above all, “goal-seeking”, that is to say grasping the peculiar features of a 
phenomenon (Ryan, 2006). So, the above-examined problem of the “model-based” landscape can 
be put as follows: which are the relations between the dynamic and structural modification of a 
system (ontological aspect) and the model choosing (epistemic aspect)? What kind of emergence is 
detected by the different class of possible models? Finally, is a general theory of the 
observer/observed relations necessary? 
 
 
6. BUILDING OF VISIONS: EMERGENCE AND LOGICAL OPENNESS 
 
Building a model, as it happens for vision, realizes a cognitive homeostatic equilibrium between 
the observer and the observed. The type of chosen model mirrors the builder’s choices about the 
system under examination. Let’s remember we have a logical close model when we can always 
assign a value to the state variables, which means we are operating within a univocally defined 
syntax. That’s when a computational approach to the problem can be followed and is useful. 
Nevertheless, most systems we deal with are logical open, continuously exchange matter, 
energy and information with environment so reshaping their internal organization and modifying 
their hierarchical and functional relations (Minati, Pessa, Penna, 1998; Licata; 2008b, 2008c). A 
system like that cannot be solved by a closed model and is described by a logical open model, i.e. 
when there does not exist a recursive procedure to determine which information is relevant or not in 
describing the system behaviour. That’s precisely the same as vision, where the feed-back between 
the bottom-up stimuli and the top-down dynamic structures leads to the emergence of new codes 
able to control the perception of new schemes. 
Just in the same way as the Gödel Theorem shows the impossibility to compress down 
mathematics into axiomatic systems - mathematics is an open system (Chaitin, 2007) - the Logical 
Openness Theory defines the complexity degree of a system in relation to its descriptive 
incompressibility within a single model. Two different models of emergence correspond to logical 
close and open models, respectively: 
 
• Computational: the formation of patterns in continuous or discrete non-linear systems, 
like dissipative structures ((Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989) or cellular automata (Wolfram, 
2002), where the information amplifying in polynomial or exponential time can be 
observed. In this case, the “newness” detected by the observer is a mathematical 
consequence, yet not banal, of the adopted model’ structure, i.e. in principle, it 
possible to have a local computational description of these systems, the detailed, long-
term unpredictability is only linked to the critical sensibility to initial conditions and 
the “loss of memory” of these ones during the dynamical evolutions; 
• Intrinsic or observational: the emerging of the system’s new behaviours cannot be 
predicted by the adopted model and it requires a new formulation of the model. It is a 
more radical case than the computational one and imposes to make use of each other 
complementary models which focus on different features of the system depending on 
its behaviour and the modeler goals as well. Far from being an exotic situation, this is 
the norm for biological and cognitive systems. These ones show semantic emergence 
through logical openness transitions indicating the system capacity to autonomously 
manage information and its relation with the environment. In other words, we can say 
that intrinsic emergence comes out when the very system’s nature compels the 
observer to build new models again and again by using different cognitive strategies 
and dynamically managing them ( Minati, 2008). 
The logical open systems can be ordered within complexity classes depending, in general, on 
the thermodynamical cost their informational and physical structures meet, which has an impact on 
the model choosing. Without going into details, we have to remember that the more a system 
complexifies its structure, the more its dissipation increases; if dissipation does not destroys the 
system, it means that there is a set of n constraints preventing it. Within this context, the term 
“constraint” globally includes the significant features of the system/environment relation, such as 
the boundary and initial conditions, balance laws, variation of parameters and so on. Let us, thus, 
introduce the concept of system with n logical openness as characterized by n number of 
constraints, with n finite. We can draw it as a graph with n vertices, each representing, from 
thermodynamical viewpoint, an entropy containment mechanism and, from informational 
viewpoint, a specific informational path by which the system processes the inputs in outputs. 
 It is easy to give a formal demonstration that a) it is impossible to describe a n logical open 
system by a single model and b) describing an n degree open system of by a model with m logical 
openness, where m<n  has always a limited validity domain. We are going to focus here on the 
likeness between these results and the formal logic limiting ones and, putting aside the 
mathematical details, to concentrate on their conceptual meaning by taking up again the graph 
image. Adopting a single model means to fix variables and interactions, i.e. a finite and fix number 
of n vertices, whereas in a highly logical open system they continuously and unpredictably emerge 
and disappear as a consequence of the internal functional organization of the system. So, adopting a 
model is an arbitrary partition the observer does on the system/environment relation. 
The model-building activity itself, like any cognitive activity, is an open system which cannot be 
described within the syntax of a “unique” model, but by means of a plurality of co-adaptive 
processes between the observer and the observed (Maturana & Varela, 1992). A “theory of 
everything” is impossible for this kind of systems. It would mean to hypothesize an infinite logical 
openness, i.e. the existence of a sort of Laplacian super-observer able to describe each state at each 
instant of the system/world relation; it is nothing else but the reductionist utopia. We get no the 
God’s Eye! (Vamos, 1991) Such idea is in consonance with the interesting Breuer theorem; he 
states that no theory, both classical or quantum, can describe each state of a system where the 
observer is excluded (Breuer 1995, 1997). 
Reductionism is a good strategy for those systems whose resolution fits models with low logical 
openness, within a one-to-one correspondence between syntax and semantics. If we now look at 
cognitive models, we will find that AI hints at an observer using logical closure where the number 
of constraints is low, time independent and thus producing inaccessible or “opaque” information 
(Clark, 1991). Connectionist models, instead, are placed at a higher level of logical openness; the 
learning of a supervised neural net, in fact, only slightly depends on the initial “genetic program” 
and it gets complexified in interacting with the environment. The ultimate level is “quantum brain”, 
a model with very high logical openness which takes into account the emerging of new codes and 
semantic domains by means of the dissipative relations with the environment (Vitiello, 2001). 
 
 
7. SCIENCE IN THE TIME OF COMPLEXITY 
 
Both vision and building world-models are features of adaptation processes implying the  
involvement of a cognitive filter, the activation of a semantic space which makes the representation 
itself possible.  We have not to intend it as a “photograph” of the world, but as a dynamic game 
between the eye and the world occurring by high logical open, creative strategies. The observer is 
part of the description by its making choices like Velázquez is inside his famous Las Meninas. This 
semantic complexity reflects the possible infinite states of  homeo-cognitive equilibrium between 
the observer and the observed. What does all that tell us about science? 
The received view of classical epistemology has always had a normative and linear character 
which has never seriously thrown into crisis – except for “local” one -  the possibility to provide an 
objective world representation achieved by the deep stratification of the theoretical fabric as well as 
the Darwinian selection of the “right” models able to pass the experience test (saving the 
phenomena) and to connect with the “fundamental” theories, such as Relativity and Quantum 
Mechanics in Physics and Natural Selection and the central dogma of molecular biology in Life 
Sciences. Occasionally, a single, problem-stemming model could undermine the theoretical 
panorama at its bottom and modifying it, such as the Planck hypothesis on the black-body radiation, 
anyway the idea of an asymptotic approximation towards a unified and definitive theory of the 
world remained untouched. It has caused not only the drastic splitting between hard and soft 
sciences - so ratifying the  Cartesian divorce between mind sciences and matter sciences – but it has 
endorsed a simplified  idea of the relations between knowledge processes and the world, the former 
regarded as method and the latter as a “code” to crack. 
On the other hand, some extreme forms of radical constructivism shift toward the relativistic-
flavoured idea of eliminating the object. A simplified idea, as well. In fact, if we decide that a 
model works, we are stating something as ‘a key opens a keyhole’ and, above all, that another 
model or another key do not work! Stating that the observer creates all that means to recognize the 
context-dependent nature of the observer/observed relation. If so, the notion of “producing a world” 
must include a unitary vision of the adaptive relations between the observer and the observed, 
rather than a dangerous ontological leaning toward either the object or the subject. The problem 
with radical constructivism is that it does not seem to find authentic explanations for the unitary 
dynamics of science, that is to say the capacity of our models to cluster into structures and meta-
structures, in syntactic classes and theoretical chains: there actually exist keys which open more 
than a door! ( See for ex.: Coniglione, 2008). 
Generally, the term “ontology” gives scientists hives since they are especially interested in 
building the conceptual and formal tools able to identify the problems and try to answer them. The 
viewpoint of traditional epistemologies is coarse-grained. In everyday reality of research, instead, 
many tendencies and micro-paradigms compete for the “saving of phenomena” and – except for few 
really well-defined syntaxes, such as Quantum Field Theory and the Standard Model – the so-called 
fundamental and most radicated theories, previous memories of scientific knowledge, do not help in 
univocally selecting among models, whose differences hardly lie in the level or comprehensiveness 
of the explanation they provide, but in their goals. 
Not by chance, D. Deutsch refers to fundamental theories as the “fabric of reality”, a set of 
leading-principles acting on emergent models as general boundary conditions (Deutsch, 1998). In 
addition, it is worthy to remember that the new acquisitions often do not modify the “form” of 
fundamental theories, but our interpretation, our way to use them in order to build new knowledge. 
The image of science is not that of a continent, but an archipelago, where we can see big 
islands, the most ancient and syntactically defined ones, and – at the same - the emerging of smaller 
islands, maybe transient, where the conceptual bridges between different islands are built again and 
again. 
To fulfil the requirements of complexity sciences, the scientific activity has to be able to 
comprehend the adaptive dynamics between system and environment as well as the model and the 
context where it is applied. Adaptive epistemology based on logical openness overcomes the thigh 
corners of both naïve objectivist conception and radical relativism temptations by stressing that the 
knowledge building is a process of continuous shifting from the “frozen” syntactical dimensions to 
the plurality choices which make possible for mind and world to meet each other. 
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